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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to show that the wide acknowledgement of the association between
innovation and economic and social development and of the importance of innovation policies has formed a
kind of “misty consensus” hardly contested in Brazil. However, the innovation policies adopted in the country
lack an institutional framework to support their implementation, marking what is called in this paper a
“messy dissensus”.
Design/methodology/approach – It is argued that the reasons why the science, technology and
innovation (ST&I) policies have failed to contribute more effectively increasing Brazilian technological efforts
have less to do with the policies themselves and more to do with their detachment from the institutional
framework used to implement them.
Findings – It is shown that this institutional framework: (i) is barely adherent to the perception of the
systemic nature of the innovation process; (ii) does not create enough incentives for bureaucrats in public
institutions to allocate resources in the industrial sector; (iii) encourages the pulverization of resources and the
consequent loss of focus, which may reduce the efﬁciency of the adopted policies; (iv) encourages the
replication of models and priorities usually adopted in contexts that fail to match the Brazilian reality.
Originality/value – In this paper, the focus is on the obstacles that undermine the potential of ST&I
policies to contribute more effectively to the improvement of the Brazilian innovation indicators. It is argued
that these obstacles have less to do with the innovation policies themselves and more to do with their
detachment from the institutional framework used to implement them. This institutional framework includes
not only the formal and legal rules but also informal social norms that govern individual behavior and
structure social interactions.
Keyword Innovation policies
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The wide acknowledgement of the association between innovation and economic and social
development has been motivating a growing presence of this subject in the public policies
worldwide agenda during recent decades. Unlike the macroeconomic prescriptions – which
are frequently subject to irreconcilable divergences – innovation policies form a kind of
“misty consensus”, as antagonists to their adoption are hardly found. In fact, innovation
policies have been considered very important not only by politicians and bureaucrats but
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also by society as a whole, including, obviously, academic communities and business
associations. Furthermore, conﬂicts usually observed between employers and employees are
hardly observed in this case.
In Brazil, since the 1990s, the recurrent comparisons between the local economy and the
fast growing Asian ones – especially South Korea – led to the crystallization of the
perception that it would be necessary to provide more incentives for innovation in the
industrial sector. That kind of perception relied on the fact that Brazil had managed to catch
up in scientiﬁc production but failed to increase its technological production signiﬁcantly.
This essentially consensual perception led to the adoption, since the 1990s, of innovation
policies explicitly focused on the industrial sector[1].
The spread of innovation policies focused on the industrial sector and the relatively high
rates of growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the period before 2014 contributed to
create an expectation that a leap in the innovation indicators would show up in the results of
the last edition of the Brazilian Innovation Survey (PINTEC)[2]. Issued by the Brazilian
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) according to the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2005) guidelines, the last edition of the survey covers
the period between 2012 and 2014. However, as shown in Section 2 of this work, in spite of
some advances, results somehow frustrated the expectations. When compared to a set of
selected countries used as reference, the relatively poor results obtained in Brazil suggest
some kind of “red queen race”, which refers to a quotation extracted from Lewis Carroll’s
Through the Looking-Glass[3]. Obviously, public policies are not the only factor that
explains the behavior of innovation indicators. In the Brazilian case, in addition to the
policies, there is evidence that the relatively low technological efforts of the industrial sector
are associated to the following structural and systemic factors:
 The local industrial structure, which is relatively less concentrated in high tech
sectors than the ones in more developed countries. Feldmann (2009, p. 136) shows
that “even the big Latin American companies do not belong, in general, to high
technology sectors”[4].
 The higher share of multinational ﬁrms in high tech industries in Brazil, as these
ﬁrms tend to concentrate their technological efforts in their countries of origin (De
Negri, 2012).
 The high levels of capital cost in Brazil, which makes innovation investments less
attractive to the industrial sector when their risks are taken into account[5].
 The relatively low exposure of the Brazilian ﬁrms to international competition[6].
Given their structural and systemic nature, these factors do not change abruptly. However,
the spread of the innovation policies focused on the industrial sector and the positive
economic environment created the expectation of an improvement in the indicators which in
fact did not happen. In this work, however, the focus is on the obstacles that undermine the
potential of science, technology and innovation (ST&I) policies to contribute more
effectively to the improvement of the Brazilian innovation indicators[7]. It is argued that
these obstacles have less to do with the innovation policies themselves and more to do with
their detachment from the institutional framework used to implement them. This
institutional framework includes not only the formal and legal rules but also informal social
norms that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions. The basic
argument of this work – which is detailed in Section 3 – is that a “messy dissensus” creates
institutional obstacles to the full effectiveness of consensual innovation policies[8]. To
support this proposition, a set of data and arguments are systematized in this paper.
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2. Background: innovation policies and innovation indicators in Brazil
Since the 1990s, Brazil adopted a set of innovation policies explicitly focused on the
industrial sector. The adoption of those policies was concurrent with the emergence of the
national innovation system concept in the theoretical ﬁeld. The concept originally proposed
by Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1988) includes, in its broad perspective, several
subsystems which are interconnected and inﬂuenced by the geopolitical, cultural, social,
political, economic and local contexts. Thus, as stressed by Cassiolato and Lastres (2008), a
more complete view of the national innovation system is not limited to a narrow perspective
which would associate it only to the production/innovation and the capacity-building,
research and technological services subsystems. In fact, the national innovation systems
have increasingly recognized typically institutional aspects which involve, for example,
rules, norms and incentives. This perception explains why this work adopts a broad
perspective of the national innovation systems. Cassiolato and Lastres (2008) argue that
since the early 1990s, the concept of national innovation system “has been used as an
analytical tool and as a framework for policy analysis in both developed and
underdeveloped countries”. That is essentially the context in which the so-called systemic
model of innovation –which adopts a more broad and complex conception of the innovation
phenomenon – spread among policy-makers.
As it considers the simultaneous inﬂuence of organizational, institutional and economic
factors on the processes of generation, diffusion and adoption of ST&I, the systemic model
is broader than the linear one, which, according to its stylized description, assumes that
innovation results from sequential steps from basic research to applied research and then to
development, production and marketing[9]. The policy implication of the linear model is,
then, to create a public research infrastructure, as the ﬁrms would in a more or less
spontaneous way beneﬁt from the results of the activities performed in universities and
research centers[10]. A systemic approach, on the other hand, emphasizes interactions as a
key condition to promote innovation in individual companies. As stressed by Johannessen
(2009), the policy implication of the interactive model is that the emphasis on research must
turn more towards relations among elements generating innovation systems at various
system levels.
Given the complex nature of the innovation process, a systemic approach seems to be
more realistic than a stylized model like the linear one. However, while the linear model is, at
the same time, analytical (because it proposes a model that permits an interpretation of the
reality) and prescriptive (because policy implications emerge from it immediately), the
systemic model is predominantly analytical and less prescriptive. The less prescriptive
nature of the systemic model explains why it is harder to extract concrete innovation policy
instruments from it. Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 615), for instance, propose a framework
where they report, in sequence, policy instruments aimed at science, at technology and at
innovation. Those instruments form a kind of sequence of layers, as the technology policies
include the science policies and the innovation policies include the technology policies.
However, in the case of the innovation policies, the reported instruments seem more related
to a “wish list” than to concrete actions which could be immediately implemented. This is
the case, for example, of actions like improving the access to the information society or
improving the social capital for regional development. On the other hand, the instruments
associated to the science and technology policies – such as public funding of research
activities, creation of public research centers or public procurement – seem much more
directly applicable.
In Brazil, the spreading of the systemic model since the 1990s was concurrent with the
adoption of several innovation policies focused on the industrial sector. Thus, in 1993, Law
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n. 8.661/1993 was enacted to establish the conditions for the concession of ﬁscal incentives
for the technological capacitation of the agricultural and industrial sectors. In spite of the
reduced number of ﬁrms that beneﬁted from that law (largely because of the rigid and
bureaucratic procedures to access the ﬁscal incentives), it might be considered a turning
point in the Brazilian ST&I policies as it explicitly focuses on the industrial sector. In the late
1990s, the so-called Brazilian science and technology sector-speciﬁc funds were established
aiming at providing more stable ﬁnancial resources to ST&I activities and at increasing the
total amount directed to R&D activities in the industrial sector. Those funds aimed at
creating an institutional environment that was more favorable to the deepening of the
cooperation between public agents and the industrial sector (Morais, 2009, p. 67).
The enactment of the so-called Innovation Law in 2004 (Law n. 10.973/2004) aimed to create
instruments to regulate the relationship between universities and research centers, on one
hand, and the industrial sector, on the other hand. Besides, the Innovation Law created the
legal background for the allocation, by the Brazilian Innovation Agency (FINEP) of grants
to business enterprises, which were, until then, forbidden (or at least controversial) in Brazil.
The following year, the legal framework to provide ﬁscal incentives to R&D activities in
Brazil was improved, as those incentives were included in the third chapter of the so-called
“Lei do Bem” (Law n. 11.196/2005). Since the mid-2000s, the FINEP launched several public
programs and calls to support business enterprises and, in the late 2000s, Law n. 12.349/2010
created the legal framework for the use of public procurement as an instrument for
supporting innovation efforts made by business enterprises. Finally, the Constitutional
Amendment n. 85/2015 altered several constitutional provisions to improve the articulation
between the state and the public and private research institutions and to broaden the set of
institutions eligible for public support for research. Given all those movements, the Brazilian
innovation policies may be considered modern and similar to the ones adopted in more
developed countries. Besides, there is considerable evidence that those instruments have
positive and signiﬁcant impacts on the technological efforts ﬁrms make. Araújo et al. (2012),
for example, used sophisticated statistical methods to control for the selection bias typically
observed in the analysis of innovation policies and concluded that the access to the sector-
speciﬁc funds has positive and signiﬁcant impacts on the ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures.
However, the advances observed in the legal framework were not fully reﬂected in the
increasing of the technological efforts of the industrial sector in the country. In fact, between
2000 and 2015, and in spite of the peak in the mid 2010s, business enterprise R&D
expenditures (taken as a proxy of the technological efforts of the industrial sector) in Brazil
remained fairly stable, as shown in Figure 1.
The data used to plot Figure 1 were calculated on the basis of the Brazilian innovation
surveys, which are performed every three years. For the remaining years, the Ministry of
Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (MCTIC is the acronym in
Portuguese) and the former Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI is the
acronym in Portuguese) either interpolated the business enterprise R&D expenditures or
extrapolated them for the years after the last available one[11]. Even when those caveats are
considered, the fact is that no signiﬁcant increase of the ratio between the business
enterprise R&D expenditures and the GDP was observed in Brazil during the period shown
in the ﬁgure. In particular, when the period between 2005 and 2013 is considered (as a
reference to comparisons with other countries shown in Table I), there was a small decrease
in the ratio (from 0.52 to 0.51 per cent or 0.01 percentage point).
The Brazilian numbers strongly contrast with the increase of the business enterprise
R&D investments in the set of selected countries shown in Table I.
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As shown above, there was a generalized growth of the ratio between business enterprise R&D
expenditures and GDP, as all the countries or groups of countries in Table I (except for Brazil)
had positive variations in that indicator. In the case of the USA (a large country with relatively
high business enterprise R&D expenditures and a diversiﬁed economy), there was an increase
of almost 0.20 percentage points. A similar variation can be observed in the case of the
European Union, where R&D investments are smaller than the ones in the USA. Countries
traditionally marked by lower business enterprise R&D expenditures and where institutions
are more similar to the ones in Brazil (Portugal and Spain) also increased their indicators
between 2005 and 2013. In the case of South Korea, the higher level of business enterprise R&D
expenditures in 2005 did not prevent an increase of 1.24 percentage points. The numbers
regarding the USA, the European Union and South Korea show that even countries located on
the technological frontier managed to increase their ratio between business enterprise R&D
expenditures and GDP. Finally, in the case of China, a clear catch up process took place, as the
aggregation of modern sectors to the local economy has been contributing to a signiﬁcant
increase in the local business enterprise R&D expenditures. In short, Table I clearly conﬁrms
the “red queen race”mentioned in the introduction of this paper.
Figure 1.
Business enterprise
R&D expenditures/
GDP, Brazil,
2000-2015
Table I.
Business enterprise
R&D expenditures/
GDP, selected
countries and groups
(2005 and 2013)
Country 2005 (per cent) 2013 (per cent) Variation (p.p.)
Brazil 0.52 0.51 0.01
United States 1.73 1.92 0.19
European Union (19 countries) 1.12 1.34 0.22
European Union (28 countries) 1.10 1.29 0.19
Portugal 0.29 0.63 0.34
Spain 0.59 0.67 0.08
South Korea 2.02 3.26 1.24
China 0.90 1.54 0.64
Source: Elaborated by the author based on Eurostat data available at: https://goo.gl/HoiQNw
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3. The dissensus: the institutional obstacles
As shown in the previous section, the slow evolution of the Brazilian innovation indicators
in a context marked by the spreading of innovation policies focused on the industrial sector
and by reasonably high GDP growth rates (before 2014) suggests the existence of some kind
of paradox, especially if the Brazilian data are confronted with the ones of other countries in
the same period. Although innovation policies are far from being capable of explaining by
themselves the path followed by the national ST&I indicators, this section discusses the
obstacles that limit the potential of those policies to contribute more effectively to the
improvement of the Brazilian innovation indicators. The basic underlying hypothesis is that
these obstacles have less to do with the innovation policies themselves and more to do with
their detachment from the institutional framework used to implement them. This
detachment becomesmore evident in the four aspects discussed in the subsections below.
3.1 Diﬃculties in implementing the systemic model
The ﬁrst aspect of the detachment of the innovation policies from the institutional
framework used to implement them has to do with the conceptual basis on which those
policies rely. Although formulated according to a systemic model of the innovation process,
the policies strongly rely on instruments that have much more to do with the linear model.
As shown in Section 2, the linear model is more prescriptive than the systemic one, as the
focus of the policies is placed on the scientiﬁc production, which would spin off to the
industrial sector. Obviously, this kind of prescription is barely applicable to policies
formulated considering the systemic model of innovation (Cavalcante, 2009). In spite of that,
the instruments used in the “systemic policies” are essentially the same as those used in the
“linear policies”. That is the case, for example, of the grants directed to researchers, which
remain strongly based on the scientiﬁc production (papers published) and only marginally
consider the technological production (patents, for example) of the candidate.
This kind of incentive obviously helps to explain the divergence of the Brazilian scientiﬁc
and technological indicators. In fact, the Brazilian share in the number of scientiﬁc papers
indexed by the Scopus – which may be considered a proxy for the scientiﬁc production –
grew from 1.18 per cent, in 2000 to 2.57 per cent in 2015 (Figure 2).
Although the share in 2015 was still low as compared to countries like the USA (22.26
per cent) and even some BRICS countries (Russian Federation, 2.59 per cent; India, 5.11
per cent; China, 17.83 per cent; South Africa, 0.72 per cent), it is quite clear that there has
been a signiﬁcant increase in the Brazilian scientiﬁc production over the past 15 years.
On the other hand, the country’s share in the world patents granted by the US Patent and
Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO) – which, in spite of its traditional methodological limitations
may be considered a proxy for the technological production – was restricted to around 0.1
per cent in the mid-2010s (Figure 3).
There seems to have been an increase since 2011 (from 0.06 to 0.11 per cent). However, in
2015, the number of patents granted to Brazilian residents reached 323, while some BRIC
countries reached thousands (Russian Federation, 440; India, 3,355; China, 8,116; South
Africa, 166). A look at USPTO data shows that Brazil has never gone beyond 400 patents
per year.
The difﬁculties to put action into effect under the systemic view of the innovation process
are conﬁrmed by anecdotal, thought recurrent and hardly deniable, evidence. De Negri et al.
(2009), for instance, show that only 1,831 (13.6 per cent) out of 13,433 projects supported by
the sector-speciﬁc funds involve ﬁrms. Although those cooperative projects represent
around 35 per cent of the total resources, the concentration of the resources in universities is
quite evident. Accordingly, Kubota et al. (2012) show that the so-called CT-Info
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(a sector-speciﬁc fund aimed at the information and telecommunication technologies)
supported only 99 ﬁrms in the period between 2002 and 2007. This kind of result led the
authors to suggest that the fund had been captured by what they call “the academy
complex”. All the data reinforces the perception that the industrial sector still has only
limited access to public resources for ST&I in Brazil. These difﬁculties are also explained by
the proportionally larger emphasis the Brazilian support agencies put on scientiﬁc
production as compared to technological production. In fact, the criteria the agencies such as
Figure 2.
Brazilian share in the
number of scientiﬁc
papers indexed by
Scorpus, 2000-2015
Figure 3.
Brazilian share in the
world patents
granted by the United
States Patent and
Trademark
Ofﬁce (USPTO)
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the National Council for Scientiﬁc and Technological Development (CNPq) and the
Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Level Personnel (CAPES) use to select projects
create incentives to publish papers, but not to deposit patents, for example (De Negri and
Cavalcante, 2013).
In spite of this more general framework, there are some successful cases marked by high
interaction levels between universities, research centers and ﬁrms. The successful cases of
aircraft technologies, agriculture innovation and offshore oil extraction observed in Brazil
seem to reinforce this perception. In fact, the research networks around Embraer, Embrapa
and Petrobras have been achieving signiﬁcant outputs. Formerly a public company,
Embraer has become one of the world’s two leading producers of regional jet passenger
aircraft. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) is a public company
which provides solutions for the development of Brazilian agribusiness through technology
generation and transfer. Finally, Petrobras, one of the largest oil companies in the world, is
controlled by the Brazilian federal government and is a world leader in offshore oil
exploitation technology. All those cases are path dependent and have been marked by a
long-term involvement of both government and industry and some sort of institutional
network. As a result, they are not easily replicable in other contexts.
3.2 Low incentives to direct resources to the industrial sector
In spite of the misty consensus about the necessity of directing resources to R&D activities
in the industrial sector in Brazil, it is much more socially accepted that the government
should direct its resources to universities and public research centers. In fact, before the
enactment of the “Innovation Law”, it was forbidden – or, at least, legally controversial – to
direct grants to R&D projects carried out by ﬁrms. In general, bureaucrats responsible for
the allocation of this kind of resource are afraid of being accused of favoring ﬁrms in
exchange for any kind of beneﬁt. As their salaries and their possibilities of getting a
promotion are not directly associated to the effectiveness of the innovation policies focused
on the industrial sector, bureaucrats would rather direct resources to more socially accepted
projects in nonproﬁt organizations. This seems to be valid even when there are good
projects and ﬁrms are capable of implementing them.
This is Viotti’s (2008, p. 161, translated by the author) point of view, to whom:
Be it because of their own nature, be it because of the traditional and institutionalized practices,
public agencies may ﬁnd it easier to deal with and support universities and research centers, but
they ﬁnd it very hard to do something similar when ﬁrms are involved. This diﬃculty has
especially to do with the eﬀorts to implement the new instruments of the policies which are aimed
at innovation, as in the case of grants and of public procurement of new products and processes.
Accordingly, public development banks, which for decades provided credit to the industrial
sector in Brazil, have difﬁculties in allocating resources to innovation activities, as it is
harder to estimate future cash ﬂows and these projects usually have less collateral than
more traditional ones. As a result, development banks have fewer incentives to direct their
resources to innovation projects. Even in the case of the Brazilian Innovation Agency
(FINEP), which focuses on innovation projects, there might be cases where credit operations
are troubled by the projects higher risk levels.
Although this aspect lacks objective evidence (bureaucrats would hardly explicitly
recognize that their decisions may not be the best for their institutions), there seems to be a
rationale for it. Risk aversion of bureaucrats – whose wages and possibilities of getting a
promotion are not related to their focus on innovation – seems to be the underlying reason
for this behavior.
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3.3 Pulverization of resources
Another aspect of the detachment of the innovation policies from the institutional
framework used to implement them are the obstacles to establishing priorities for these
policies. In general, bureaucrats responsible for the allocation of resources to ﬁnancing
innovation activities have more incentives to pulverize the resources over a large number of
small projects than to concentrate them in a smaller, but more coherent, number of projects.
That is essentially a consequence of the way the bureaucrats are legitimized. As bureaucrats
rely on the approval of the “scientiﬁc community”, they prefer to contemplate each
researcher with a small amount of resources instead of allocating them to a smaller number
of larger projects. In short, they prefer to have “twenty little friends” and not “nineteen little
enemies and one big friend”. As a result, innovation policies tend to be shaped by the
demand and not by the focus on strategic areas and the projects tend to lack scale and
continuity.
According to data presented by De Negri et al. (2009), the average value of the projects
ﬁnanced by the sector-speciﬁc funds between 2000 and 2008 was US$140 thousand.
Although it might be considered relatively high in some more traditional sectors marked by
incremental innovations, it is unlikely that this amount is enough to carry out competitive
projects in areas like biotechnology and nanotechnology, which tend to require large scale
laboratories. Table II, built upon data presented by De Negri et al. (2009), shows the average
project value for each sector-speciﬁc fund in the period 2000-2008.
As shown in the table, the average project value ranges from US$52 thousand, in the case
of the water resources fund, to US$2 million, in the case of the telecommunications fund.
Table II.
Number of projects,
total and average
value, sector funds,
2000-2008
No. of projects Total value (R$ thousand)
Average value
(R$ thousand)
Aeronautics 47 40,975 872
Agribusiness 683 37,112 54
Amazônia 78 19,077 245
Waterborne transport 57 12,149 213
Biotechnology 189 22,904 121
Energy 640 81,605 127
Space technology 6 1,812 302
Water resources 786 41,237 52
Informatics 524 35,356 67
Infrastructure 811 354,264 437
Mineral resources 161 12,356 77
Oil 1,228 112,272 91
Health 424 27,638 65
Transport 9 1,678 186
Transversal projects 5,854 494,891 85
Telecommunications 54 108,218 2,004
FNDCT 707 79,288 112
Other sources 242 48,824 202
Grants 330 281,025 852
“Horizontal fund” (“green and yellow”) 603 70,725 117
Total 13,433 1,883,406 140
Note: Values originally in Brazilian Reals (BRL) converted to US$ using the average exchange rate of the
period 2000-2008
Source: Elaborated by the author based on data by De Negri et al. (2009)
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Even the largest amounts may be considered low when compared with the average size of
projects in leading economies. This kind of perception led Morais (2009, p. 37) to argue that
“there was a pulverization of resources in a high number of small projects which had low
impact on the country’s competitiveness”.
3.4 Isomorphic innovation policies
Even if it was possible to avoid the pulverization of resources, the priorities established for
the innovation policies would tend to be generic and to reproduce the priorities of other
countries marked by different economic and social realities, leading to a kind of
“isomorphism” analogous to the concept originally proposed by Meyer and Rowan (1977).
According to those authors, organizations tend to keep their structures isomorphic aiming at
legitimacy. This perception is similar to Keynes’s (1937, p. 214) proposition that “knowing
that our own individual judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall back on the judgment of the
rest of the world which is perhaps better informed”.
In the speciﬁc case of the innovation policies, the bounded rationality, the bureaucrat’s
need of legitimacy and the high levels of uncertainty are the reasons why policy-makers
tend to replicate models and priorities shaped in other contexts. As bureaucrats responsible
for the allocation of resources need to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the politicians, it is
reasonable to assume that their decisions are oriented, to some degree, by their desire for
acknowledgment. Evidences for this argument may be found in cross-country comparisons
of ST&I priorities in OECD countries (OECD, 2010, p. 89 apud IEDI, 2011). The OECD
segments those priorities into groups like “environment, climate change and oceans”,
“health and life sciences” or “natural resources and energy”. Some countries declared more
than ten ST&I priorities, and on several occasions, those priorities seem detached from local
conditions or endowments. As a result, priorities established for Turkey, for example, do not
seemmuch different from the ones established for Germany.
In Brazil, explicit industrial and ST&I policies usually present generic challenges (such
as “to promote innovation and technological development”) or mention several of the topics
used by the OECD to compare ST&I priorities. For example, the so-called “Plano Brasil
Maior” issued in 2011 mentions national security (“complexo industrial da defesa”),
sustainability, renewable energy sources, health, social challenges (“social inclusion”),
engineering, nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication technologies
and cultural diversity. In short, almost all priorities used by the OECD are somehow
mentioned in the industrial and ST&I policy issued in 2011 (Brasil, n.d). In a country where
the resources allocated to ST&I activities are proportionally lower than the resources
allocated by OECD countries, the absence of clear priorities adherent to the local conditions
might seriously harm the possible outcomes of the actions undertaken.
4. Concluding remarks
In this work, it has been argued that the wide acknowledgement of the association between
innovation, economic and social development and the importance of innovation policies
have formed a kind of “misty consensus” hardly contested in Brazil. However, the
innovation policies adopted in the country lack an institutional framework to support their
implementation, marking what was called a “messy dissensus”. Thus, the reasons why the
ST&I policies failed to contribute more effectively to the increase of the Brazilian
technological efforts have less to do with the policies themselves and more to do with their
detachment from the institutional framework used to implement them, as the “messy
dissensus” emerges at the moment these policies are put in march. To support that
argument, it was shown that:
INMR
15,4
382
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
89
.4
4.
84
.1
06
 A
t 1
2:
17
 0
4 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
8 
(P
T)
 The institutional framework is barely adherent to the perception of a systemic
nature of the innovation process. Although formulated according to a systemic
model of the innovation process, the policies strongly rely on instruments which
have much more to do with the linear model.
 There are not enough incentives for bureaucrats in public institutions to allocate
resources to the industrial sector because it is much more socially acceptable that the
government should direct its resources to universities and public research centers.
 The institutional framework encourages the pulverization of resources and the
consequent loss of focus, which may reduce the efﬁciency of the adopted policies. As
bureaucrats rely on the approval of the “scientiﬁc community”, they prefer to
contemplate each researcher with a small amount of resources than to focus on a
few strategic projects. As a result, innovation policies tend to be shaped by the
demand and not by the focus on strategic areas and the projects tend to lack scale
and continuity.
 In practice, bureaucrats tend to adopt models and priorities established for contexts
which are different from the Brazilian reality. Bounded rationality, bureaucrats’
need of legitimacy and high levels of uncertainty are the reasons why policy-makers
tend to replicate models and priorities shaped in other contexts.
The update of the institutional framework used to implement the innovation policies in
Brazil is, therefore, required to make these policies contribute more effectively to the
increase of the country’s technological efforts. This update involves the creation of new
incentives for bureaucrats and public institutions to allocate resources to the industrial
sector. These incentives may include lighter and less bureaucratic procedures to direct
resources to ﬁrms along with the creation of severe punishments in cases of misuse of
resources. Policy evaluation should also be enhanced to allow the institutional framework to
be calibrated. Finally, to avoid the pulverization of resources and foster the establishment of
priorities more adherent to the local reality, transparency and accountability procedures
could be applied to the innovation policies adopted in the country.
Notes
1. The main features of those policies are described in Section 2 of this work.
2. Between 2001 and 2010, average GDP growth rate reached 3.68 per cent, higher than the averages
of the previous decades (2.61 per cent in the 1990s and 1.57 per cent in the 1980s). Between 2011
and 2013, growth rates reached 2.96 per cent (relatively high for Brazilian standards in the past
decades). However, in 2014, 2015 and 2016 growth rates were only 0.5, – 3.77 and – 3.59 per cent.
3. “[. . .] it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere
else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”
4. Cavalcante and De Negri (2011) and Cavalcante (2014) analyze the relation between business
enterprise R&D expenditures and industrial structure in Brazil and compare it to the more
developed countries.
5. Treasury bills interest rates in Brazil at the end of 2015, 2016 and 2017 reached 14.25, 13.75 and
7.00 per cent, respectively. Even considering their downward trend and adjusting for inﬂation,
those rates are very high, particularly when compared to the interest rates in several developed
countries, which remained close to zero in the same period. Rates of return of innovation project
require a spread over the risk-free capital costs. As a result, on several occasions, these projects
are simply unfeasible in Brazil.
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6. The ratio exports plus imports as a per cent of GDP, which is a usual measure of trade openness,
is very low in Brazil (below 27 per cent according to the World Bank Data). Despite the
limitations of this indicator – especially in the case of larger economies – it reinforces the
perception that Brazilian ﬁrms are not exposed to international competition very much.
7. Authors like Pinto and Feldmann (2016, p. 66) argue that “the governments do not foster a proper
institutional environment for the emergence of innovation”, but those authors do not focus on the
institutional framework used to implement the innovation policies.
8. According to the Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, the ﬁrst known use of the word “dissensus” in
English dates back to 1962. We decided to use it (instead of the more commonly used “dissent”)
to establish a contrast between the “misty consensus” and the “messy dissensus”.
9. The reference document for the linear model is Bush (1945). Viotti (2003) mentions the chain link
model and the technological learning model, which would better describe innovation process in
developing countries.
10. Authors like Balconi, Brusoni and Orsenigo (2010), however, complain about the caricaturizing of
the linear model, which is frequently presented in papers that discuss the systemic model. In
additions, Mazzoleni and Nelson (2005) claim that the importance of the knowledge produced in
universities and research institutes in the economic development process of a country has
become increasingly higher.
11. In Brazil, in order to follow the Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002), the former MCTI calculated the
business enterprise R&D expenditures as the sum of (i) private and state enterprises
expenditures; (ii) other federal state enterprises expenditures; (iii) R&D expenditures in graduate
programs in private institutions.
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